Inklings Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 1997-2016
Volume 4 A Collection of Essays Presented at
the Fourth Frances White Ewbank Colloquium
on C.S. Lewis & Friends

Article 28

3-2004

Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the Works of C.S.
Lewis
Mike Mitchell

Follow this and additional works at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/inklings_forever
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, History Commons, Philosophy Commons, and
the Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Mitchell, Mike (2004) "Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the Works of C.S. Lewis," Inklings
Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 1997-2016: Vol. 4, Article 28.
Available at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/inklings_forever/vol4/iss1/28

This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the British Author Collections at Pillars at Taylor
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Inklings Forever: Published Colloquium Proceedings 1997-2016 by
an authorized editor of Pillars at Taylor University. For more information, please contact pillars@taylor.edu.

INKLINGS FOREVER, Volume IV
A Collection of Essays Presented at
The Fourth

FRANCES WHITE EWBANK COLLOQUIUM
ON

C.S. LEWIS & FRIENDS
Taylor University 2004
Upland, Indiana

Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key
in the Works of C.S. Lewis
Mike Mitchell

Mitchell, Mike. “Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the Works of C.S. Lewis.”
Inklings Forever 4 (2004) www.taylor.edu/cslewis

Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the Works of C.S. Lewis
Mike Mitchell

Once when asked what he thought of a book
entitled Honest to God, Lewis replied, “I prefer being
honest to being ‘honest to God.’”1 It is an unmitigated
honesty, with one’s self and with God, which Lewis
establishes as the central epistemological issue. This is
not a surface level honesty—not a general, storge
honesty—but an honesty directly related to the purity
and intensity of one’s will. According to Lewis, the
condition of one’s will is the epistemological key.
Through a scrutiny of internal motives and of emotional
prejudices, Lewis’s epistemology seeks to expose all
those factors in human nature that so constantly, yet
subtly, evade and distort the truth. This is not to say that
Lewis did not place a high value on a person’s ability to
reason and the quality of his or her logic—especially
the logic of theological inquiry—but he understood that
this was not the primary issue in the process of
discovering the truth.
This being the case, Lewis’s approach can best be
described as an epistemology of the will. The quality of
one’s will to believe is the most decisive factor in
someone being in a state of belief or unbelief. In
Lewis’s perspective, a person’s desire to know the truth
must exceed the desire to secure self-interests.
It necessarily follows from the orthodox Christian
concept of an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good God,
and from the fact that his explicit intent is for people to
know him, that if a person who claims to want to know
him does not know him—does not see what God has
attempted to explicitly show—that the person must be
less than honest in his or her claim to seek God. As will
be shown, the presence of such dishonesty often results
in a shallow, yet comforting illusion, which ultimately
results in an inability to know one’s own true identity,
God’s identity, and the necessary implications therein.
It will be good to begin with a passage from
Chapter nine in The Great Divorce which is very
indicative of Lewis’s view of the importance of honesty
and/or purity of will. In this passage the protagonist
asks George Macdonald about the fate of “the poor
Ghosts who never get into the omnibus at all,”

essentially raising the question of the fate of those who
lie outside the truth and that of the accessibility of the
truth to them. Macdonald replies:
Everyone who wishes it does. Never fear.
There are only two kinds of people in the end:
those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and
those to whom God says, in the end, ‘Thy will
be done.’ All that are in Hell choose it.
Without that self-choice there could be no
Hell. No soul that seriously and constantly
desires joy will ever miss it. Those who seek
find. To those who knock it is opened.
If it is the case that no one who “seriously and
constantly desires joy will ever miss it,” why then are
there so many (The Great Divorce is filled with
descriptions of them) of those who do miss it and yet
experience such a deep sense of injustice? For many
people, the mere idea of Hell evokes such a sense of
injustice that they paradoxically claim to reject
orthodox Christian doctrine on moral grounds. This
sense of injustice is often a result of a person’s failure
to come to terms with his or her own sin. It is a willful
blindness for the sake of defending one’s own
righteousness.
No where in Lewis’s writing is this issue
expounded on more thoroughly than in the work he
personally considered to be his masterpiece, Till We
Have Faces. This story, written as a novel, retells the
Greek myth of Cupid and Psyche as a means to
allegorically answer the question raised by the disciple
Judas (not Judas Iscariot) in John 14:22: “But, Lord,
why do you intend to show yourself to us and not to the
world?”—a question which brings to a sharp point the
issue raised above: why are those who see God so
seemingly few, when he is “not wanting anyone to
perish, but everyone to come to repentance?”2
Orual, the protagonist and speaker throughout the
story, explains her motivation for writing the story:
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I am old now and have not much to fear from
the anger of gods. I have no husband nor
child, nor hardly a friend, through whom they
can hurt me . . . Being, for all these reasons,
free from fear, I will write in this book what
no one who has happiness would dare to write.
I will accuse the gods, especially the god who
lives on the Grey Mountain. That is, I will tell
all he has done to me from the very beginning,
as if I were making my complaint of him
before a judge. But there is no judge between
gods and men, and the god of the mountain
will not answer me.3
She “accuses” the gods and explains the source of the
freedom with which she writes to be the fact that there
is no one through whom the gods can hurt her. Clearly,
Orual’s case screams of injustice—an injustice
grounded in the thought that she suffers at the hands of
the gods, yet is given no clear access to them or to an
understanding of their demands on her. As revealed in
the last line of this passage, it is this concealing of the
gods—their refusal to reveal themselves to her—that is
Orual’s main contention against them: “there is no
judge between gods and men, and the god of the
mountain will not answer me.”
One of the ways in which Lewis conveys his point
with such power is that, through much of the story,
Orual’s case against the gods appears to be a fairly
justified one. Orual’s earthly life is not at all an easy
one. She is the unwanted daughter of a tyrant king, has
a strikingly unattractive appearance, and a self-absorbed
sister whose appearance is just the opposite. While
Orual is still a child, her mother dies giving birth to her
youngest sister, Psyche, with whom Orual eventually
has a relationship that is sweeter than the rest of her life
is bitter.
However, despite the blissful relationship between
the two girls and the apparently redeeming value it has
in Orual’s otherwise treacherous life, Psyche is
eventually taken from her. She is offered in sacrifice to
the god of the Grey Mountain mentioned in the opening
passage, and thus the suspicion based on Orual’s plight
up until the time of Psyche—that the gods had hated
her—is seemingly confirmed, but not without some
doubt. The offering of Psyche to the god of the Grey
Mountain turns out to be a marriage rather than a
sacrifice, which is Lewis’s allegorical expression of
Psyche’s conversion. Soon after, Orual makes a
dangerous trek to retrieve Psyche from the mountain
and upon finding her is deeply troubled as Psyche
speaks of a god and a palace of grandeur (all part of the
conversion experience), none of which Orual can see.
She is thrown into a crisis of faith, but quickly decides
that the responsibility for her lack of sight of the object
of faith lies with the gods and not with herself. Her

account of her fleeting vision is very telling:
And now, you who read, give judgment. That
moment when I either saw or thought I saw the
House—does it tell against the gods or against
me? Would they (if they answered) make it a
part of their defence? Say it was a sign, a hint,
beckoning me to answer the riddle one way
rather than the other? I’ll not grant them that.
What is the use of a sign which is itself only
another riddle? . . . They set the riddle and
then allow a seeming that can’t be tested and
can only quicken and thicken the tormenting
whirlpool of your guess-work. If they had an
honest intention to guide us, why is their
guidance not plain? Psyche could speak plain
when she was three; do you tell me the gods
have not yet come so far?4
Throughout the story, and culminating with the
exchange between the two sisters, Lewis allegorically
poses the glaring question about Jesus’s seeming
selectiveness in revealing himself to people. Why do
the gods choose to reveal themselves with such lucidity
to Psyche, and yet with vague, fleeting visions to Orual?
Orual’s conclusion is that the reason for such apparent
favoritism is the capriciousness and injustice of the
gods.
Soon after Orual’s discovery of the differences in
what she and Psyche can and cannot see, she attempts
to turn to the gods in prayer in a passage of great
strategic importance in conveying the thrust of Lewis’s
message about the importance of honesty in
epistemology. When Orual returns home after her
encounter with Psyche, she is soon left alone and then
does something she says she thinks, “few have done”:
I spoke to the gods myself, alone, in such
words as came to me, not in a temple, and
without a sacrifice. I stretched myself face
downward on the floor and called upon them
with my whole heart. I took back every word I
had said against them. I promised anything
they might ask of me, if only they would send
me a sign. They gave me none. When I began
there was red firelight in the room and rain on
the roof; when I rose up again the fire had
sunk a little lower, and the rain drummed on
as before.5
Because her prayer is portrayed as a genuine one, it is
this passage that gives Orual’s case against the gods the
most credence. It is a prayer offered in seemingly
authentic humility, but is still met with only silence.
The shape of Orual’s argument against the gods is
very important in understanding the epistemological
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point Lewis is making. The sympathy for Orual evoked
from the reader is key in his didactic strategy. Orual is
not a fatuitous, pampered character who takes the good
things in life for granted. There are few good things in
her life, and when she receives the rare gift of genuine
love, the very person who gives it is taken away from
her. She is then told of the immense grandeur on the
mountain, which, if real, would remedy all her pain and
bring utter fulfillment, but she is unable to see it. Then
her seemingly authentic plea to the gods for answers is
met with dead silence.
This dilemma is also raised with painful clarity in
Lewis’s much more personal work, A Grief Observed,
in which he records his thoughts and feelings during a
period of bereavement after the death of his wife.
Notice the striking similarity of Orual’s complaint
against the gods and Lewis’s own emotions as he seeks
God’s comfort in his time of tremendous pain:
Meanwhile, where is God? This is one of the
most disquieting symptoms. When you are
happy, so happy that you have no sense of
needing Him, so happy that you are tempted to
feel His claims upon you as an interruption, if
you remember yourself and turn to Him with
gratitude and praise, you will be—or so it
feels—welcomed with open arms. But go to
Him when your need is desperate, when all
other help is vain, and what do you find? A
door slammed in your face, and a sound of
bolting and double bolting on the inside. After
that, silence. You may as well turn away. The
longer you wait, the more emphatic the silence
will become. There are no lights in the
windows. It might be an empty house. Was it
ever inhabited? It seemed so once. And that
seeming was as strong as this. What can this
mean? Why is He so present a commander in
our time of prosperity and so very absent a
help in time of trouble?6
It is a sense of injustice that under girds both Orual’s
case against the gods and Lewis’s own feelings in his
bereavement. Judas’s question is found woven
throughout these and others of Lewis’s works. Why
does God show himself to some and not to others? Why
does he remain silent when someone so desires to hear
him to speak?
As in the case with Orual, many are tempted to
think this reflects God’s arbitrary nature and his
indifference to human need. As has been said, many
argue that the lack of success in God’s plan to make
himself known is his fault. Orual, however, is
eventually faced with the sobering reality that the only
obstacle which prevents her from seeing all that Psyche
sees and from hearing the gods clearly lies completely

within herself. At the end of the story Orual stands in
the presence of the gods on her judgment day and is
forced to read her complaint against them from the
book in which she has written this complaint over and
over again through the course of her life. Amazingly,
when this same complaint, which has always sounded
so completely justified, is read in the immortal world—
that is in the real world—it sounds completely different
than when Orual is writing it. The book of complaint
itself even appears differently when it is seen in
immortality: “A little, shabby, crumpled thing, nothing
like my great book that I had worked on all day, day
after day . . . ”7 And when she is forced to read the
complaint aloud what is heard is not the words that she
has said, but those she has meant. Thus, the hollow,
self-centered grounds on which she bases her case
against the gods is revealed.
Then, in what is arguably the most riveting passage
in the book, Orual realizes why the gods have not
shown themselves to her, despite her incessant request:
The complaint was the answer. To have heard
myself making it was to be answered. Lightly
men talk of saying what they mean . . . When
the time comes to you at which you will be
forced at last to utter the speech which has lain
at the center of your soul for years, which you
have, all that time, idiot-like, been saying over
and over, you’ll not talk about joy of words. I
saw well why the gods do not speak to us
openly, nor let us answer. Till that word can
be dug out of us, why should they hear the
babble that we think we mean? How can they
meet us face to face till we have faces?8
It is only when we are honest enough to show God our
true faces that he is able to show us his. Thus the
question that plagues Orual throughout the story is
answered in her realization that she has not been honest
enough in asking to receive an answer.
Similarly, Lewis makes an observation toward the
end of A Grief Observed that provides some remedy for
the dissonance expressed in the passage cited earlier.
I have gradually been coming to feel that the
door is no longer shut and bolted. Was it my
own frantic need that slammed it in my face?
The time when there is nothing at all in your
soul except a cry for help may be just the time
when God can’t give it: you are like the
drowning man who can’t be helped because he
clutches and grabs. Perhaps your own
reiterated cries deafen you to the voice you
hoped to hear.
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On the other hand, “Knock and it shall be
opened.” But does knocking mean hammering
and kicking the door like a maniac? And
there’s also “To him that hath shall be given.”
After all, you must have a capacity to receive,
or even omnipotence can’t give. Perhaps your
own passion temporarily destroys the
capacity.9
Once it is understood that certain legitimate passions
like grief can hinder our capacity to receive knowledge
from God, it becomes all the more clear how those
sinful passions, which are inherently contrary to God’s
nature, can deafen our ears to his voice, just as they
deafen Orual.
Each of the above cases emphatically makes the
point that the responsibility for the failure of God’s
endeavor to reveal himself lies completely with the
people who do not receive the revelation. The important
thing to see in the above examples is that if a person is
honest enough to admit his or her sin, this, in itself,
does not solve the problem of God’s inaccessibility
(only repentance can do that), but it does show the
problem to be a moral rather than epistemological one.
In other words, if a person were to persist in sin, he or
she would still be damned, but would raise no
epistemological dilemma—no theatrical screams of
injustice. The truly honest person would never ask the
question, “If God is real, why doesn’t he reveal
himself?”
This being said, it is clear that the basis for
disbelief in Lewis’s characters is emotional or moral
rather than rational. It is not an absence of evidence, or
even the presence of contrary evidence that obstructs
the revelation of God. It is the inability to come to
terms with the obstruction of personal sinfulness or
misplaced value; one does not have the heart to tell
one’s self it is evil.
Lewis shows this same principle in A Grief
Observed when he calls into question God’s goodness.
Again, much like Orual, what Lewis has to say in the
book takes the form of an argument, or rather a case
against God. But the “argument” is eventually exposed
as an emotional vent in disguise. After being motivated
by his deep grief to question God’s goodness, Lewis
asks, “Why do I make room in my mind for such filth
and nonsense? Do I hope that if feeling disguises itself
as thought I shall feel less? Aren’t all these notes the
senseless writhings of a man who won’t accept the fact
that there is nothing we can do with suffering except to
suffer it?”10 In the same way, the question “Why
doesn’t God reveal himself” is often a feeling disguised
as thought—the writhing of an unfulfilled person who
cannot honestly face the fact of his own sin and so, like
Orual, instead pleads a false (yet dramatic) case of
injustice. When this happens—when the disguise is put

on—the scope of the problem is subtly shifted from one
of personal honesty and repentance to one of
epistemology.
This process of disguising the true nature of the
issue can also be clearly seen in the exchange between
the Spirit and the ghost of the Bishop in chapter five of
The Great Divorce: “‘I’m not sure that I’ve got the
exact point you are trying to make,’ said the Ghost. ‘I
am not trying to make any point,’ said the Spirit. ‘I am
telling you to repent and believe.’”11 The ghostly
Bishop is intent on keeping the scope of the
conversation in the intellectual realm, but the Spirit sees
through this and calls him to an act of the will—“repent
and believe.” Ultimately it is the Bishop’s lack of will
to repent that prevents him from becoming a solid
person, and thus from seeing God.
Christian doctrine and the evidence that supports it
remains the same, but people often don’t have the will
to accept it or to abide by it because, as has been
shown, a greater value is placed on gratification
promised by sin, or on the prevention of the pain and
humility brought about by honest acknowledgement of
sin. In other words, finding the answer to the question
of God is really not as complicated as often thought, it’s
just that there is so much about us that is not willing to
face what that answer implies. As a result, we try to
evade our responsibility for disbelief by shifting the
issue into the realm of epistemology where we can
disguise our lack of will to believe with cries of
injustice or ignorance or insufficient evidence or flawed
epistemological method.
With this in mind, a particular relevance to the task
of Christian apologetics becomes clear. There is much
contemporary debate on proper epistemological
method. This is certainly an important issue, but also
one which tempts us to think that there is more at stake
in it than there really is. For those who claim that God
has not shown himself clearly, choosing the most
rationally sound epistemological paradigm will not
help; for them, that which hinders a successful
epistemology is not rational. Indeed, the most effective
epistemological method is most clearly articulated by
Jesus in the answer he gives to the question asked of
him by the disciple Judas noted earlier: “‘But, Lord,
why do you intend to show yourself to us and not to the
world?’ Jesus replied, ‘If anyone loves me, he will obey
my teaching. My Father will love him, and we will
come to him and make our home with him.’”12 The way
to see Jesus is to obey Jesus, and obedience is an act of
the will.
This being the case, we must, like the Spirit to the
Bishop, know when to make a point or to simply say
(and often to ourselves) “Repent and believe”; we must
not let the core issue be shifted or disguised. According
to Lewis, rather than a flawless philosophical paradigm,
honesty with one’s self and with God is the kingpin,
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epistemological factor. Replacing dishonesty and
emotional prejudice with honest repentance will bring
the truth flowing full and clear like the removal of a
clog in a water line or the most structurally important
brick in a dam. We must realize that the keenness of our
epistemological method (as truly important as it is) will
be of no effect to anyone who lacks the will to know the
truth.
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